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Regulation of Medicine Patents by the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement to Broaden Access to Medicine
By Daniel Lee1
One1of the most concerning areas of recent
patent enforcement is a life or death matter for
thousands of people around the world. Restricted access
to vital medicines in developing countries is one of the
most controversial international intellectual property
issues today. There is a new international treaty called
the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA)
being negotiated among developed countries, and it is
expected to bring a huge impact on access to medicine in
developing countries.2
This article proposes what ACTA should include
in order to protect access to medicine in developing
countries. It discusses the need to allow broader
compulsory licensing of pharmaceutical patents to
encourage increased production of generic drugs and
bring down the overall prices of essential medicine in
developing countries. It also examines the need to
regulate counterfeit drugs in order to promote research
and development from pharmaceutical companies, while
correctly distinguishing generic drugs from counterfeit
drugs. Lastly, this article concludes by suggesting
the need for a provision in ACTA that recognizes
the importance of access to medicine provisions in
multinational treaties over the regional and bilateral
agreements.
The most recent major agreement on
international intellectual property rights enforcement
is the World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS)
Agreement.3 The TRIPS Agreement is an international
agreement that sets the basic norms of international
intellectual property standards along with other
1. Daniel Lee, 2011 J.D. Candidate at the Washington College of
Law at American University, B.S. in Biochemistry/Cell Biology in
2007 at University of California, San Diego. Daniel is a 2009-2011
Articles Writer for The Intellectual Property Brief.
2. Margot Kaminski, The Origins and Potential Impact of the AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement, 34 Yale J. Int’l L. 247, 247 (2009).
3. See Maxwell R. Morgan, Medicines for the Developing World:
Promoting Access and Innovation in the Post-TRIPS Environment, 64
U. Toronto Fac. L. Rev. 45, 48 (2006) (explaining that the access to
medicine issue transcends the recent heated debate on the implementation of TRIPS Agreement and its impact on medicine prices).
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international agreements such as the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) agreements.4 The
TRIPS Agreement extends patent terms in all fields of
technology to twenty years, and requires that all WTO
states provide patent protection for all inventions.5 This
requirement also applies to pharmaceutical patents,
resulting in a significant restriction on vital medicines in
developing countries.6
While every party involved agrees that large
populations of developing countries lack meaningful
access to health-related technologies, approaches to this
problem differ significantly between developed countries
and developing countries.7 The International Bill of
Human Rights acknowledges that access to medicine is a
fundamental right of every person.8 On the other hand,
pharmaceutical companies must also protect their patent
rights in order to secure their profit to keep producing
medicines and seeking out innovations.9
There are some provisions in the TRIPS
Agreement and the subsequent Doha Declaration
that provide some flexibility to the restricted access to
medicines resulting from TRIPS. Article 6 of TRIPS
allows for “Parallel Importation”, which happens when a
patented good sold by the patentee is imported without
his consent10; Article 2 of TRIPS recognizes continued
application of the Paris Convention, which forces patent
4. Susy Frankel, Challenging TRIPS-plus Agreements: The Potential
Utility of Non-Violation Disputes, 12 J. Int’l Econ. L. 1023, 1039
(2009).
5. Morgan, supra note 2, at 48.
6. Id.
7. See Tina S. Bhatt, Amending TRIPS: A New Hope for Increased
Access to Essential Medicines, 33 Brook. J. Int’l L. 579, 598-599
(2008) (discussing the lack of meaningful access to AIDS/HIV
medicine in African countries due to high price while addressing the
need of profit from patent by pharmaceutical companies to promote
research and development).
8. Siddartha Rao, Closing the Global Gap: A Pragmatic Approach
to the Access to Medicines Problem, 3 J. Legal Tech. Risk Mgnt.1, 3
(2008) (citing to Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 25
(1)).
9. See Bhatt, supra note 5, at 601 (arguing that “patent protection
is necessary for the continued availability of drugs”).
10. Morgan, supra note 2, at 61.
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holders to file foreign patent applications within a
year from their domestic filing date in order to acquire
an international patent;11 Paragraph 7 of the Doha
Declaration extends the TRIPS implementation for
pharmaceutical products in the least developed countries
until January 1, 2016;12 and most importantly, Article
31 of the TRIPS Agreement allows for the compulsory
licensing of pharmaceutical patents and for exportation
of medicines produced under compulsory licenses to
eligible importing member nations.13
Recently, there have been rounds of new
bilateral trade agreements that impose additional
enforcement of patent rights between developing
nations and developed nations.14 These bilateral and
regional trade agreements are called “TRIPS-plus,” and
include additional intellectual property provisions in
the Free Trade Agreements (FTA) among developed
and developing countries.15 The TRIPS-plus agreements
deter developing nations from taking full advantage of
the flexibility provisions in the TRIPS, by forcing them
to adopt stricter intellectual property provisions.16
ACTA is still a work in progress, and thirteen
countries, including the United States, have joined in
the negotiations. Although the negotiation process
has been kept confidential, some released material
indicates that the new agreement will contain even
stricter enforcement measures, including increased
criminal sanctions for infringement and stronger border
measures.17 Considering ACTA’s purpose and nature, it
can be predicted that the agreement will further decrease
access to medicines in developing countries.18
I. Broader Compulsory Licensing and More
11. Id.
12. Id. at 63.
13. See id. at 60 (quoting F.M. Scherer & J. Watal, “Post-TRIPS
Options for Access to Patented Medicines in Developing Countries”
in Commission on Macroeconomics and Health Working Paper Series (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2001) Paper No. WG4:1
at 13).
14. See Bhatt, supra note 5, at 617-618 (arguing that new FTA
Agreements made by the United States “contain provisions that far
exceed the protections offered by TRIPS”).
15. Id. at 618.
16. See id. (explaining that American bilateral and multilateral
FTAs include provisions that limit exclusions of patentability,
require broader definition of patents, prevent parallel importation,
limit scope of compulsory license, and permit prosecution of nonviolation claims).
17. Kaminski, supra note 1, at 247.
18. See id. (arguing that ACTA will likely be the strictest enforcement measures among many countries).

Generic Drugs: Profit Maximizing Pricing of Medicine by
Pharmaceutical Companies Creates Deadweight Loss
Pharmaceutical companies holding drug patents
have almost monopolistic control over the price of their
medicine.19 When pharmaceutical companies set a price
for their medicine in a market, they usually pursue a
profit-maximizing strategy, rather than considering
what would allow for greater access to the medicine.20
This strategy works because the demand for essential
medicine is likely inelastic in theory, in that the demand
by the consumers for the medicine will tend not to
decrease as the price of the medicine increases.21 This
profit-maximizing pricing strategy consequently creates
a large dead weight loss in developing countries.22 Since
the majority of the population in the least developed
countries earns an income below the poverty line, a
small increase of a medicine price can make medicines
inaccessible for an enormous amount of people in
need.23 However, it is often more profitable and more
efficient for the pharmaceutical companies in developing
countries to impose a high price on their medicine
and target the top percentage of a rich population,
rather than selling the maximum possible quantity in a
market.24 Sometimes these medicine prices in developing
nations are even higher than comparable drug prices in
developed countries.25
An example is illustrated by Professor Sean
Flynn of American University in Washington, D.C.
According to 2006 UNAIDS data, there are 5.5 million
HIV/AIDS patients in South Africa.26 Assuming that
HIV prevalence is uniform in the population, with
each decile containing 550,000 people in need of
antiretroviral treatment, if the price of an anti-retroviral
is set at $1,481 per patient per year, only 550,000
people (10% of total HIV patients) can afford it.27
The total revenue earned at this price point is $814.6
19. See Morgan, supra note 2, at 56 (arguing that in return for
granting medicine patent holders monopolistic control over their
patents, society gains full disclosure of the invention).
20. Sean Flynn, Aidan Hollis & Mike Palmedo, An Economic
Justification for Open Access to Essential Medicine Patents in Developing Countries 8 (U. of Calgary Dep’t of Econ. Working Paper No.
2009-01).
21. Id. at 10.
22. Id. at 8.
23. Id. at 10.
24. Id. at 12.
25. Id. at 18.
26. Flynn, supra note 18, at 17.
27. Id.
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million.28 However, if the price of an antiretroviral is
set at $396, about half of the total HIV patients can
afford the anti-retroviral with total revenue of $435.6
million.29 Further calculation by Professor Flynn shows
that revenues keep falling as pharmaceutical companies
reduce prices and increase production.30 Thus, in South
Africa, pharmaceutical companies will profit the most if
they price their antiretroviral at $1,481, so that only the
top ten percent of the population can afford it.31 This
is higher than the profit-maximizing price of $1,468 in
Norway, where 80% of the population can afford the
same medication at this price level due to their relatively
uniform high income.32
II. Broader Compulsory Licenses Can Bring
in More Generic Competition and Reduce the Price of
Medicine and the Deadweight Loss
One of the most effective ways to bring down
the cost of high priced essential medicine is to bring
in more generic competition through more aggressive
compulsory licensing.33 Compulsory licensing means
that a patent holder is compelled to grant a license
to third parties to use the patent. It is often used in
antitrust law and patent law.34 As mentioned earlier,
Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement contains procedural
requirements to obtain compulsory licenses. The
unauthorized user must make a reasonable effort to
obtain a license from the patent holder and provide
adequate remuneration based on the economic value of
the use.35 However, TRIPS also waives these procedural
requirements in case of a national emergency or other
extreme urgency.36
The problem with the compulsory licensing
flexibility is that only some developing countries have
the infrastructure to take advantage of the provision and
produce generic drugs under the compulsory license.37
Most developing countries rely on the export and
import of generic drugs produced by the few capable
developing nations.38 The August 30th Agreement,
28. Id. at 18.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Flynn, supra note 18, at 20.
33. Rao, supra note 6, at 15.
34. Id. at 8.
35. Morgan, supra note 2, at 60.
36. Id. at 61.
37. Id. at 64.
38. See id. (explaining that the Article 31(f ) of TRIPS allows a
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adopted by the TRIPS council in 2003 in addition to
the TRIPS Agreement, outlines this import and export
system procedure, but its “ad hoc, case-by-case, countryby-country procedural system” creates segmented
markets.39 This results in a substantial inefficiency to
the compulsory licensing system and high transaction
costs.40 Entry of generic drugs into the market then
becomes burdened, because demand for a generic
drug by one particular segmented market often shows
insufficient incentives for an overall generic entry.41
In addition, there is a growing concern regarding
the seizure of generic drugs being transported from
a developing country to other developing countries.
European countries tend to impose local intellectual
property laws on pass-though cargos, which pause briefly
in these countries to refuel or change their mode of
transportation on the way to their final destination.42
These “transit countries” take the view that passthrough generic drugs are in violation of their local
intellectual property laws and can be seized, regardless
of their destination.43 For example, in December 2008,
Dutch customs authorities seized several cargos of the
generic drug Losartan Potassium in transit from India
to Brazil.44 The Dutch customs authorities released the
cargos after 36 days, but they released the cargos back to
India instead of allowing the cargos to ship to Brazil.45
In order to encourage more efficient exportation
and importation of generic drugs produced under
compulsory license among developing countries, ACTA
should simplify burdensome procedural requirements
as much as possible. It should allow the generic drug
market in developing countries to be viewed as a
whole, in order to create enough demand for generic
entry. Furthermore, ACTA should prohibit the transit
countries from applying their local intellectual property
laws to generic drugs in transit to developing countries,
WTO member nation that has shown insufficient or no manufacturing capacities to import medicines produced under compulsory
license).
39. Id. at 84.
40. Id.
41. Morgan, supra note 2, at 84.
42. ConsumerInternational.com, European Countries Imposing
Local Intellectual Property Laws on Cargo Passing Through, http://
www.consumersinternational.org (follow “member information”
hyperlink; then follow “member news” hyperlink; then follow “generic drugs seized in transit: IP laws threatening access to affordable
medicine” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 1, 2009).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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to ensure the fast and efficient supply of essential
medicines to developing countries.
III. Funding for Innovation by Stronger Regulation
on Counterfeit Drugs
Research and development of new drugs cost
substantial amounts of money and involves high risks
of unsuccessful products.46 On the other hand, generic
drugs bear little to no research and development costs
and involve substantially fewer risks, since the drug
is already proven to be successful.47 This is why the
introduction of generic alternatives of more expensive
patented medicines in markets is often said to be
the deterrent to research for innovative new drugs.48
Pharmaceutical companies often view high profits as
incentives for their patented technology, and when
these incentives are low, they are reluctant to make
investments to enter into the market and experiment
with new drugs.49

line between generic drugs and counterfeit drugs and
imposing strict regulations to eliminate counterfeit
drugs. Regulating counterfeit drugs through ACTA
can have two positive effects. First, casualties caused by
dangerous counterfeit drugs can be eliminated. Second,
by gaining back the market share held by counterfeit
drugs, pharmaceutical companies can increase their
revenue and thus have more financial support for their
research and development. However, it is important
not to confuse generic drugs with counterfeit drugs
since elimination of generic alternatives can only cause
restricted access to medicine in developing countries.

A counterfeit drug is a medicine “which is
deliberately and fraudulently mislabeled with respect to
identity and source.”52 Unlike generic drugs, counterfeit
drugs can have incorrect or inactive ingredients that can
cause injuries or even death, instead of curing a disease.53
Counterfeit drugs are extremely profitable because there
is a high demand for affordable medicine from the
54
In order to promote research and development of large poor populations in developing countries. Many
new drugs and vaccines for neglected diseases, incentives customers in developing countries cannot distinguish
between counterfeit drugs and generic drugs.55 In Africa,
to pharmaceutical companies are needed while keeping
counterfeit drugs encompass up to thirty percent of all
generic competition in place.50 There have been many
56
mechanisms proposed to help research and development, medicines sold among developing African nations.
Inadequate knowledge and insufficient regulations
such as public and private research funding, advance
continue to contribute to the expansion of counterfeit
purchasing, and bulk purchasing.51 However, these
drugs.57
mechanisms are separate from ACTA since they involve
voluntary funding and are not geared toward altering
In 2006, the World Health Organization
enforcement mechanisms.
formed an international partnership called IMPACT
One way that ACTA can help increase research
and development of new drugs is by drawing a clear
46. See Bryan Mercurio, Resolving the Public Health Crisis in the
Developing World: Problems and Barriers of Access to Essential Medicines, 5 Nw. U. J. Int’l Hum. Rts. 1, 53 (2006) (explaining that
research and development cost of drugs account up to thirty percent
of total production costs: only 5 of every 250 compounds enter into
clinical trials where over half of the compounds fail, and additional
large numbers of fail at the regulatory stage).
47. See Morgan, supra note 2, at 82 (explaining that a generic drug
company does not incur front-end investments cost associated with
researching and developing new drugs even though there are still
transaction costs and capital costs).
48. See id. at 56 (introducing an existing theory that monopolistic incentives from patent stimulate research and development by
pharmaceutical companies).
49. Flynn, supra note 18, at 6.
50. See Morgan, supra note 2, at 99 (arguing that in addition to
keeping medicine prices down in developing countries, new strategies to incentivize innovation are required).
51. See id. at 99-105 (explaining financial strategies such as pull
and push mechanism, advance purchasing and orphan drug laws to
promote innovation).

to combat counterfeit drugs.58 IMPACT’s goal is to
“eradicate counterfeit drugs by influencing legislation
and increasing awareness”.59 There has not yet been
an international treaty to regulate counterfeit drugs.60
ACTA can be the first international treaty to regulate
counterfeit drugs by imposing criminal and civil
penalties for the production and distribution of
counterfeit medicines, while keeping a wide door open
to the production of generic drugs and compulsory

52. Amanda Chaves, A Growing Headache: The Prevalence of
International Counterfeit Pharmaceutical Trade in Developing African
Nations, 32 Suffolk Transnat’l Rev. 631, 633 (2009).
53. Id. at 637.
54. Id. at 635.
55. Id. at 637.
56. Id. at 636.
57. Id. at 637.
58. Chaves, supra note 45 at 644.
59. Id. at 645.
60. Id. at 646.
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licensing.61

Thus, TRIPS-plus add-on intellectual property
provisions, such as the intellectual property provisions
IV. Preemptive Power of TRIPS Over Regional
in FTAs, are international agreements that must obey
Treaties
the minimum standard and frameworks of the TRIPS
Agreement to comply with basic international law.71 It
As mentioned in the introduction, flexibilities
can then be said that by enforcing stricter intellectual
in multinational treaties such as TRIPS and ACTA
property standards and taking benefits of the TRIPS
can be jeopardized by bilateral and regional TRIPSAgreement away from developing nations, the TRIPSplus agreements.62 TRIPS-plus agreements include
intellectual property provisions in Free Trade Agreements plus provisions deteriorate the72TRIPS Agreement in
violation of international law.
between developed countries and developing countries,
and they usually impose stricter domestic intellectual
By continuing to push TRIPS-plus provisions,
property enforcement than the multinational treaties.63
the U.S. and EU are violating an international treaty
The TRIPS-plus provisions are usually unfair
negotiations resulting from unequal economic power
between the negotiating nations.64 Developing nations
are forced to agree upon the TRIPS-plus provisions in
obtaining other bigger trade benefits.65 The U.S. and
the EU are known to have non-negotiable ‘template’
intellectual property chapters for the FTAs.66
For example, TRIPS-plus provisions in the U.S.
bilateral and multilateral Free Trade Agreements include
“limiting the potential exclusions from patentability,
requiring the grant of patents for ‘new uses’ of
known compounds, requiring the extension of patent
terms under certain conditions, preventing parallel
importation, limiting the ground on which compulsory
licenses can be granted, and permitting the prosecution
of non-violation nullification or impairment claims.”67
Any country that agrees to a Free Trade Agreement with
the U.S. is bound by this term, which clearly limits
or eradicates the flexibility provisions provided in the
TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration.68
It is true that the TRIPS Agreement allows
the member nations to enact stricter enforcement
provisions.69 However, international law allows nations
to make an international agreement with other nations
under a condition that such agreements do not conflict
with other international agreements of these nations.70
61. Id. at 647.
62. Bhatt, supra note 5, at 618.
63. Id.
64. Frankel, supra note 3 at 1024.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See also Bhatt, supra note 5, at 618.
68. Id.
69. Frankel, supra note 3 at 1040.
70. Id.
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and standards that are viewed necessary by the rest of
the world.73 One way to resolve the problems caused by
the TRIPS-plus agreements can be adopting a provision
in ACTA that requires all of the negotiating nations to
abide by the international treaties, such as ACTA and
the TRIPS Agreement, prior to regional TRIPS-plus
agreements. This provision will provide preemptive
power to ACTA and the TRIPS Agreement over the
TRIPS-plus provisions and deem conflicting TRIPS-plus
provisions unenforceable.
Concerns regarding access to medicines in
developing countries keep growing each day. The
upcoming Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
needs to demonstrate a new way to enforce intellectual
property rights while preserving adequate access
to medicine for developing countries. One way of
supporting access to medicine is to provide wider access
to generic drugs by allowing more compulsory licensing.
Introduction of generic drugs in a market brings down
drug prices and can offer greater access to essential
medicine.
Introduction of generics lowers drug prices but
also deters research and development of new drugs by
pharmaceutical companies. There needs to be global
research support mechanisms in place to encourage
further innovation. In addition, by eradicating
counterfeit drugs while carefully distinguishing them
from generic drugs, ACTA can increase total revenue for
pharmaceutical companies, and thus more money can be
used for more research and development of new drugs.
However, all of these flexibilities and efforts
for greater access to medicine can only be successful
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Bhatt, supra note 5 at 619.
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if all the parties to the treaty abide by it prior to other
bilateral and regional agreements. If the U.S. and other
members of the WTO are dedicated to increase access
to medicine and the right to health, they should agree
to adopt and abide by multinational treaties such as
TRIPS and ACTA over the provisions in the TRIPS-plus
agreements.
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